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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH. 
Respondent, 
Plaintiff and 
Case No. 
vs. 
JACK ZEIMER. 
'Defendant and 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACfS 
9013 
Respondent agrees with appellant's statements of facts. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN THE LANGUAGE USED IN HIS INSTRUC-
TIONS TO THE JURY. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN GRANTING A NEW TRIAL ONLY AS TO 
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2 
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS AN 
HABITUAL CRIMINAL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN THE LANGUAGE USED IN HIS INSTRUC-
TIONS TO THE JURY. 
Respondent readily admits that the Trial Judge used words 
which are inartistic. However, respondent cannot see how the 
jury could have misunderstood its rather simple obligation in this 
case or how the words "guilt," "guilty," "convict," "convicted," 
"convicting" and "offense" could have misled them. The jury's 
members were not trained lawyers, and while such words have 
rather specific significance in the minds of attorneys and judges, 
they do not bear the same meanings to the minds of laymen. 
It would not seem to the jury at all out of line for the 
judge to use the term "offense" in relation to one's having the 
status of habitual criminal, nor would it seem at all odd for him 
to use the terms "guilt" or "guilty" with reference to such a 
status. 
Even the term "convict" used as a verb, is not sufficiently 
precise in the :mind of a lay person to cause him to regard the 
status o!' habitual criminal as being a crime when it is not actually 
called a crime in the instructions. 
The courts are aware that judges must deliver their in-
structions in a timely way and cannot fully avoid an occasional 
misuse of a word or a phrase. 23 C.J.S., Sec. 1300, page 881. 
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states: 
3 
"A large discretion is vested in the trial judge as to the 
language to be used in expounding principles of law. 
The exactness of statement which is required in plead-
ings is not necessary.'' 
And on the next page, the text continues: 
"An instruction is not erroneous because of verbal or 
technical inaccuracies or mistakes which are not mis-
leading to the jury or prejudicial to the rights of the 
accused.'' 
As to the usage of particular words, our Utah Court has 
not said a great deal. However, in the case of State v. Cerar, 60 
U. 208, 207 P. 597, the court discussed the matter of a judge 
using an instruction containing the word ''can'' where the statute 
I 
upon which his instruction was based used the term "must." 
The court concluded that while the language of the statute had 
not been used, that it reRected the true intent and purpose of 
the statute and said: 
"Any juror with sufficient intelligence to sit in any case 
could not be misled by what the court said.'' 
Clearly the jury in this case could not have been misled as to the 
necessity of determining defendant's status. 
Moreover, even i/ the jury thought that being an habitual 
criminal was a "crtme" instead of a "status," still the defendant's 
rights could not have been prejudiced, since the jury would not 
have been less inclined to give a defendant fair consideration 
when trying him. for a crime than when making a determination 
as to his status. 
Instructions aside. defendant was not charged in the in-
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4 
formation with having committed any supposed "crime" of 
habitual criminal. While it is true that the usual printed infor-
·mation form was used, the actual wording typed in the informa-
tion was "that the said defendant · is a habitual criminal" 
Nowhere on page 2 of the information is any reference made to 
any supposed "crime" of habitual criminal. R. 14. 
Furthermore, the sentence and judgment ordering defend-
ant to serve a term in the Utah State Prison refers to "status 
of an habitual criminal.'' R. 73, R. 75. 
From a consideration of the language used in the informa-
tion and in the sentence and judgment, and verdict R. 56. it is 
difficult to see how appellant successfully can allege that he was 
convicted of a "crime" of habitual criminal, regardless of the 
terms used in the instructions. 
There can be no doubt that the information, along with 
the sentence and judgment, and verdict must prevail over the 
instructions in determining whether the habitual criminal pro-
ceeding was held to determine the perpetration of a crime or the 
existence of a status. 
In the Washington case of Williams v. Smith, 171 P.2d 
197, the court held that a form of verdict finding defendant 
guilty of the "crime of being an habitual criminal" was tech-
nically improper, but did not affect any of his substantial rights, 
and was sufficient to fix his status as habitual criminal. Reasoning 
therefrom it would seem to be immaterial whether or not the 
jury thought it was determining a crime or a status. 
Assuming, but not admitting, that improper language was 
used in the instructions, stili, respondent does not believe that 
any such possible error can reasonably he· considered prejudicial 
LJill 
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5 
to the substantive right of the defendant to a fair trial. 
Furthermore, respondent is unable to see, considering all 
the instructions given at the trial, and regarding them as a whole, 
as well as the pleadings in the case, how appellant has suffered 
any loss of substantive rights or that the Judge corn,tnitted prej-
udical error. 
After hearing all the instructions read, the jury knew that 
its one simple function was to determine whether or not the ap-
pellant had co)Inmitted two previous crimes for which he had 
been sentenced to prison, (the instant conviction for burglary 
having been stipulated to by counsel}, and whether or not, there-
fore, he had achieved the status of habitual criminal. 
It is, of course, necessary that all, of the instructions be 
construed as a whole. See State v. Evans, 7 4 Utah 389, 2'7'9 P. 
950. 
In its first instruction, R. 59, the Judge used the following 
language: 
"You are instructed that the defendant, Jack Zeimer, is 
.charged by page two of the infonnation filed herein of 
being in the status of an habitual criminal. * * *" 
It will be observed that the Judge was very careful to use the 
phrase "beihg in the status of an habitual criminal." Nowhere 
does any part of the instruction use the term "crime.'' This in-
struction is . of primary importance because it is the one which 
actually sets out the allegations of page 2 of the infoiiDation, and 
which informs the jury of the issue to be defined. 
Instruction No. 8, R. 64, states as foilows: 
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·'The term 'habitual criminal' is de tined as follows: 
Whoever has been previously twice convicted of felon-
ies sentenced and cOlffimitted to any prison, shall, upon 
conviction of a felony committed in this state, other than 
murder in the tirst or second degree, be deemed to he 
an habitual criminal." 
It will be observed that this is the proper legal definition of the 
term "habitual criminal," and in it the judge was careful to use 
the term "be deemed to be an habitual criminal." The word 
"deemed" certainly is more consistent With status than with 
crime. 
Some consideration should be given to Instruction No. 5, 
R. 6 L of which instruction, as a whole, appellant complains. 
In paragraph 1 thereof the court uses the term "being an habitual 
criminal,'' and in the last paragraph of the instruction, uses the 
expression ''status of being an habitual criminal.'' 
Clearly, the instructions of which appellant complains must 
be considered in conjunction with those from which we have 
just quoted. That is to say, all instructions are to be considered 
together. State v. Evans, supra. 
In State v. Siddoway, 61 U. 189, 211 P. 968, the Court's 
opinion stated in part as follows: 
''Instructions must be considered as a whole and so the 
court informed the jury. Taking the instructions to-
gether, no good reason occurs to us for believing that 
jurors endowed with common sense and average intelli-
gence could misunderstand. misconstrue or misapply 
them.'' 
General rules of law which apply to instructions used in 
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criminal cases would seem to apply to instructions given in a 
proceeding such as the one at hand. Therefore the respondent 
calls to the attention of the Court the case of Bridges v. United 
States, 199 F. 2d 811 , wherein the court states: 
"Instructions given in a criminal prosecution may not be 
taken apart and a phrase here and clause, or even a 
sentence or paragraph there, used to find error." 
The following cases, among many others, stand for the 
proposition that the instructions are to be considered as a whole: 
Statev. Hansen (Ida.), 181 P. 2d 192; People v. Marsh (Ill.). 
85 N.E. 2d 715; Taylor v. State (Okla.), 208 P. 2nd 185; 
State v. Hendricks, 123 Utah 267, 258 P. 2d 452. 
The Marsh case states: 
·'Accuracy in the use of language in an instruction con-
taining a correct proposition of law would, of course. 
he desirable, but it is not always obtainable. For that 
reason we announced the rule that it is sufficient if the 
series of instructions, considered as a whole, fully and 
fairly announce the law applicable to the theories of 
the People and of the defendant, respectively. People 
v. DeRosa, 378 Ill. 557, 39 N.E. 2d 1; People v. 
Hichette, 324 III. 170, 155 N.E. 39." 
The holding in the Taylor case is particularly interesting 
in that it holds that where it appeared that the instruction com-
plained of ''was most poorly worded,'' but not misleading in light 
of all the instructions, it did not constitute reversible error. In 
the instant case the main problem also appears only to be a mat-
ter of poor wording in the instructions. 
Each instruction used was given with the intent and the 
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effect of assuring a fair and just tricil of the issues·; Many of them 
are regular in__structions unifo:mnly given for the protection of those 
accused of crimes. They also are equally applicable ·to those 
accused of having attained a status. Not only are they not prej-
udical instructions, but instead are statements calculated only 
to assure free and fair consideration of the defendant's cause. 
They were favorable to him rather than unfavorable when con-
sidered as a whole. 
It should also be pointed out that the defendant's attomev 
had the opportunity to ask for any additional instructions which 
might clarify the group of instructions as a whole. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN GRANTING A NEW TRIAL ONLY AS TO 
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER VEFENDANT WAS AN 
HABITUAL CRIMINAL. 
Respondent recognizes and admits that the proper pro-
cedure to be followed in determining the status of one alleged 
to be an habitual criminal is that set forth in Section 76-1-19, 
U.C.A. 1953. 
We believe, however, that this statute applies only to the 
original instance compris,ing the trial upon the substantive charge 
and the accompanying proceeding to determine the defendant's 
status, whether as an habitual criminal or not. 
Respondent does not believe that the statute has manda-
tory application in a situation such as the one at hand where, for 
one reason or another, the court has found it necessary to order 
a new proceeding only as to the single issue of defendant's 
habitual criminal status. 
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An analogous situation is seen in the case of State u. Lee 
Lim, 76 U. 68, 7 P. 2d 825. There a defendant was sentenced 
to the state prison on a plea of ·guilty to a charge of murder in 
the second degree. He later was released on habeas corpus pro-
ceedings because the sentence had been improper, even though 
imposed within the statutory period. Defendant thereupon was 
rearrested and upon the basis of his prior plea, resentenced, this 
time properly, to the state prison. 
On his appeal to the Supreme Court, defendant urged 
that our statute requiring that sentence be imposed during a 
period between two and ten days after the conclusion of the 
trial prevented his now being sentenced, since a period of three 
and one-half years had passed since the original trial. In dispos-
ing of this argument . the court stated that: 
''It is apparent that Section 904 1 of our Code has no 
application to a case where the trial court in good faith 
attempted to follow the law but through mistake en-
tered a void judgment instead of a valid one. Our 
Legislature, however, has made provision with respect 
to errors and mistakes in the administration of the crim-
inal law in the following language: 'Neither a departure 
from the form nor mode prescribed by this Code in re-
spect to any pleading or proceeding, nor any error or 
mistake therein, shall render it invalid unless it shall have 
actually resulted in a miscarriage of justice.' Comp. Laws 
of Utah 1917, Sec. 9365." · 
See present statute: 77-53-2, U.C.A. 1953. 
By the same token the Court in the case at bar did, in fact, 
follow the requited statutory procedure in the original instance. 
The substantive charge appearing on page 1 of the indictment was 
tried separately by the same jury from the habitual criminal issue 
appearing on page 2. of the indictment. 
. . 
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The reasoning in State v. Lee Lim, therefore, would appear 
to be applicable in the instant case. Here a bona tide eH'ort was 
made to follow the precise terms of our statute, but because of a 
mistake made in the habitual criminal aspect of the original triaL 
the court deemed it necessary to declare a mistrial as to that issue 
only, and as to it to require a second triaL which of necessity had 
to be by a separate jury. -
Clearly, the Legislature simply did not forsee this exact 
situation and for that reason failed to make any provision to 
cover the matter at hand. 
Appellant refers to two Califomia cases, both entitled 
People v. Morton. The later Morton case, 41 Cal. 2d 636, 261 
P. 2d 523, was decided in 1953. It would appear to be con-
trolling over the other cases cited in appellant's brief and, in fact, 
gives much consideration to each of the procedural steps sug-
gested in appellant's brief. 
The case clearly sets out the proper procedure under the 
Califomia statute and in so doing affords us some interesting and 
helpful reasoning. There a defendant was convicted of three 
counts gf tirst degree burglary and one count of attempted bur-
glary in tlrst degree, for which he was sentenced to serve consecu-
tive terms. In the same proceeding he was adjudged an habitual 
criminal. His appeal was merely from that part of the judgment 
adjudging him an habitual criminal and from an order denyin~ 
his motion for a new trial on the issue of one of the prior convic-
tions. Therefore, while not identical with the instant case, it is 
closely analogous. 
There the court used the following language: 
"When the sole question on remand from an appellate 
court involves the proof of an alleged prior conviction, 
there is no reason to require the parties to re-try the 
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question of guilt of the primary offenses when the cor-
rectness of the determination of this question is not chal-
lenged by either party. There is nothing prejudicial 
involved in a· limited new trial on the issue of the chal-
lenged prior conviction by a jury different from that 
which tried the issue of guilt of the primary offenses. 
That issue and the proof of prior convictions are clearly 
severable. McVickers, supra; In Re Seeley, 29 Cal. 
2d 294, 176 P. 2d 24; People v. Carrow, supra. Proof 
of prior convictions or the adjudication that the defend-
ant is an habitual criminal do not involve substantive 
offenses, but merely provide for increased punishment 
of those whose prior convictions fall within the scope 
of these statutes. In Re McVickers, supra, 29 Cal. 2d 
264, 270-271, 176 P. 2d 40, 44-45, and references 
cited there. The ilmportant relation between the primary 
offenses and the prior convictions charged is therefore 
the sentence to be imposed and the jury does not par-
ticipate in that.'' 
Respondent does not dispute appellant's contention that 
the California statute ·in force at the time of the above opinion 
did not require the trial of the two issues by the same jury. How-
ever, appellant reiterates his view that under the Utah statute 
the trial of the two issues by the same jury is mandatory only in 
the original instance. Therefore, assuming this, the opinion of 
the California court should be accorded great weight. 
A primary purpose in having the defendant tried on both 
phases of the case by a single jury might well be that of de-
termining the question of habitual criminal in a timely manner 
in order that the sentence might be imposed within the statutory 
period, thus eliminating delays that might come from the im-
panelling of a new jury and the conducting of a new trial. 
In State v. Stewart, 110 Utah 203, 171 P. 2d 383 (after 
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12 
setting out the procedure to be followed in trying a defendant 
accused of being an habitual criminal--which procedure is sub-
stantially the same as that now required by our statute), the 
court says at page 387: 
"While safeguarding the rights of the accused, such 
procedure does not otfend any principle of orderly pro-
cedure nor tend to delay justice." 
The Court, at another point in its opinion, indicated clearly 
that the substantive right sought to be guarded by the statute 
was to he relieved of being advertised to the jury as one who had 
previously been convicted of the new otfense. Respondent is 
not aware how this right can better be provided a defendant 
through having the main issue and the question of habitual crim-
in(!.l tried by the same jury. 
As a matter of fact, trial by a separate jury can only benefit 
a defendant. Clearly a jury which has sat through a long trial and 
has come to believe that defendant has performed the unlawful 
acts necessary to constitute the crime alleged in the main issue, 
would likely be more inclined to believe that such defendant had 
in the past perpetrated other unlawful crimes than. would a fresh 
jury with no prior exposure to the defendant and his misconduct. 
In fact, a new jury would be free of any possible prejudice against 
the defendant and would be completely capable of judging ob-
jectively his status as habitual criminal or not. 
It would appear to be a totally unnecessary use of time 
and ,effort and, in fact. to constitute a burden on the judicial proc-
ess, to require the retrial of one issue already fully and fairly 
deteJmined, and which is not in any way vital to the detennina· 
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tion of another, particularly where the two issues are entirely 
separated in the information. 
Finally, even assuming error on the part of the court, both 
in giving the instructions complained of and in allowing the 
habitual criminal issue to be tried by a separate jury (after the 
proper procedure had been used in the first instance), still, the 
supposed error was not serious enough to be classified as prej-
udical. and therefore the judgment below should not be dis-
turbed. 
Our court has spoken on this issue on many occasions and 
respondent sets forth the words of the court in the case of State 
o/ Utah v. Don /esse Neal, 1 U. 2d 122, 262 P. 2d 756: 
"We are also conscious of the fact that a trial in the 
courts of this state is a proceeding in the interest of 
justice to determine the guilt or innocence of the ac-
cused, and not just a game. We will not reverse crim-
inal cases for mere error or irregularity. It is only where 
there has been error which is both substantial and prej-
udicial to the rights of the accused that a reversal is 
warranted. The defendant was entitled to a full and 
fair presentation of the case to a jury of unbiased citizens 
an~. to have his rights safeguarded by competent coun-
sel. 
Even considering the fact that the trial of the issue of whether 
or not one is an habitual criminal is only to determine a status 
and not to determine the perpetration of a crime, respondent 
feels the above language is entirely appropriate and relies thereon 
for his conclusion that even if error complained of was committed 
in the case, it was not prejudicial. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent does not believe that the use of the indicated 
language in the court's instructions, when properly considered 
in conjunction with other instructions given, was prejudicial in 
any way to the substantive rights of appellant. 
Nor does the respondent believe that appellants' being 
tried by a separate jury a second time only as to the habitual 
criminal issue constituted prejudicial error. In fact, respondent 
believes that appellant not only was not injured, but instead was 
given even more favorable and unbiased consideration than he 
would have been given had both the allegations of the substantive· 
crime and the habitual criminal issue been finally tried by the 
same jury. 
In light of the preceding cases and reasoning, respondent 
prays the Court for an order affii'ming the decision of the trial 
court. 
Respectfully submitted 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
Attorney General 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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